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Abstract. 19th century real analysis received a major impetus
from Cauchy’s work. Cauchy mentions variable quantities, limits,
and infinitesimals, but the meaning he attached to these terms is
not identical to their modern meaning.
Some Cauchy historians work in a conceptual scheme domi-
nated by an assumption of a teleological nature of the evolution
of real analysis toward a preordained outcome. Thus, Gilain and
Siegmund-Schultze assume that references to limite in Cauchy’s
work necessarily imply that Cauchy was working with an Archi-
medean continuum, whereas infinitesimals were merely a conve-
nient figure of speech, for which Cauchy had in mind a complete
justification in terms of Archimedean limits. However, there is an-
other formalisation of Cauchy’s procedures exploiting his limite,
more consistent with Cauchy’s ubiquitous use of infinitesimals, in
terms of the standard part principle of modern infinitesimal anal-
ysis.
We challenge a misconception according to which Cauchy was
allegedly forced to teach infinitesimals at the Ecole Polytechnique.
We show that the debate there concerned mainly the issue of rigor,
a separate one from infinitesimals. A critique of Cauchy’s approach
by his contemporary de Prony sheds light on the meaning of rigor to
Cauchy and his contemporaries. An attentive reading of Cauchy’s
work challenges received views on Cauchy’s role in the history of
analysis, and indicates that he was a pioneer of infinitesimal tech-
niques as much as a harbinger of the Epsilontik.
Keywords: butterfly model; continuity; infinitesimals; limite;
standard part; variable quantity; Cauchy; de Prony
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Since Weierstrass’s time, we have
held a fairly contemptuous view of
the infinitesimalists which I regard
as unfair. – Ivor Grattan-Guinness
1. Introduction
Cauchy exploited the concepts of variable quantity, limit, and infini-
tesimal in his seminal 1821 textbook Cours d’Analyse (CdA). However,
the meaning he attached to those terms is not identical to their modern
meanings. While Cauchy frequently used infinitesimals in CdA, some
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scholars have argued that Cauchyan infinitesimals are merely short-
hand for prototypes of ǫ, δ techniques. Moreover, one can legitimately
ask whether the material found in CdA was actually taught by Cauchy
in the classroom of the Ecole Polytechnique (EP). A valuable resource
that sheds information on such issues is the archive of summaries of
courses and various Conseil meetings at the EP, explored by Guitard
([29], 1986), Gilain ([23], 1989), and others. Among the key figures
at EP at the time was Gaspard de Prony, whose critique of Cauchy’s
teaching will be examined in Sections 3.5 and 3.6. While de Prony was
critical of Cauchy, a careful examination of the criticism indicates that
de Prony’s main target was what he felt was excesssive rigor, rather
than an alleged absence of infinitesimals. While scholars sometimes
claim that Cauchy avoided infinitesimals in the 1820s, de Prony’s com-
ments and other primary documents indicate otherwise.
1.1. Limites. Cauchy defined limits as follows in his Cours d’Analyse
(CdA):
On nomme quantite´ variable celle que l’on conside`re
comme devant recevoir successivement plusieurs valeurs
diffe´rentes les unes des autres. . . . Lorsque les valeurs
successivement attribue´es a` une meˆme variable s’app-
rochent inde´finiment d’une valeur fixe, de manie`re a` finir
par en diffe´rer aussi peu que l’on voudra, cette dernie`re
est appele´e la limite de toutes les autres.1 (Cauchy [15],
1821, p. 4; emphasis in the original)
Here Cauchy defines limits in terms of a primitive notion of a variable
quantity. As Robinson pointed out, Cauchy “assign[ed] a central role
to the notion of a variable which tends to a limit, in particular to the
limit zero” (Robinson [40], 1966, p. 276).
Elsewhere in CdA, Cauchy used what appears to be a somewhat
different notion of limit, as for example when the value of the derivative
is extracted from the ratio of infinitesimals ∆y and ∆x (see Section 2.1).
Two distinct approaches used by Cauchy are analyzed in Section 1.2.
1.2. A-track and B-track for the development of analysis. The
article Katz–Sherry [33] introduced a distinction between two types of
procedures in the writing of the pioneers of infinitesimal calculus:
1Translation from [14, p. 6]: “We call a quantity variable if it can be considered as
able to take on successively many different values. . . . When the values successively
attributed to a particular variable indefinitely approach a fixed value in such a way
as to end up by differing from it by as little as we wish, this fixed value is called
the limit of all the other values.”
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(A) procedures in pioneering work in analysis that can be based on
an Archimedean continuum (or the A-track approach), cf. [1];
and
(B) procedures that can be based on a Bernoullian (i.e., infinitesimal-
enriched) continuum (the B-track approach), as they appear in
Leibniz, Bernoulli, Euler, and others.
This is not an exhaustive distinction, but one that helps broaden the
lens of a historiography often handicapped by self-imposed limitations
of a Weierstrassian type; see Section 1.4.
Here we use the term procedure in a broad sense that encompasses
algorithms but is not limited to them. For instance, Euler’s proof of
the infinite product formula for the sine function is a rather coherent
procedure though it can hardly be described as an algorithm; see [4]
for an analysis of Euler’s proof.
Like Leibniz, Cauchy used both A-track and B-track techniques in
his work. The sample discussed in Section 3.8 below illustrates his A-
track work. Elsewhere, as we document in this article and in earlier
work (see e.g., [11]), Cauchy used B-track techniques, as well.
1.3. What is Cauchy’s limite? Scholars who stress Cauchy’s use of
the limit concept rely on a traditional but flawed dichotomy of infinites-
imals vs limits. The dichotomy is flawed because limits are present
whether one works with an Archimedean or Bernoullian continuum
(see Section 1.2). In fact, the definition of derivative found in Cauchy
(see Section 2.1) suggests that he works with the B-track version of
limits which is referred to as the standard part function in modern in-
finitesimal analysis; see Section 4, formula (4.3). Thus the real issue
is whether Cauchy’s continuum was Archimedean or Bernoullian, and
the genuine dichotomy is between A-track ǫ, δ techniques and B-track
infinitesimal techniques.
1.4. Butterfly model. The articles (Bair et al. [3]), (Bair et al. [4]),
and (Fletcher et al. [22]) argued that some historians of mathematics
operate within a conceptual scheme described in (Hacking [30], 2014)
as a butterfly model of development.
Inspired in part by (Mancosu [38], 2009), Ian Hacking proposes a
distinction between the butterfly model and the Latin model, namely
the contrast between a model of a deterministic (genetically deter-
mined) biological development of animals like butterflies (the egg–
larva–cocoon–butterfly development), as opposed to a model of a con-
tingent historical evolution of languages like Latin.
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Historians working within the butterfly paradigm often assume that
the evolution of mathematical rigor has a natural direction, leading for-
ward to the Archimedean framework as developed by Weierstrass and
others (what Boyer referred to as “the great triumvirate” [13, p. 298]).
Such historians also tend to interpret the qualifier rigorous as neces-
sarily implying Archimedean, as we illustrate in Section 1.5.
1.5. Siegmund-Schultze on Cours d’Analyse. As an illustration
of butterfly model thinking by modern historians, we turn to a review
by historian Siegmund-Schultze of an English edition of CdA (Bradley–
Sandifer [14], 2009). The review illustrates the poignancy of Grattan-
Guinness’ comment quoted in our epigraph. The comment appears in
(Grattan-Guinness [26], 1970, p. 379) in the context of a discussion of
CdA.
Siegmund-Schultze’s Zentralblatt (Zlb) review ([43], 2009) of the
English edition of CdA contains two items of interest:
(SS1) Siegmund-Schultze quotes part of Cauchy’s definition of con-
tinuity via infinitesimals, and asserts that Cauchy’s use of in-
finitesimals was a step backward: “There has been . . . an in-
tense historical discussion in the last four decades or so how
to interpret certain apparent remnants of the past or – as com-
pared to J. L. Lagrange’s (1736–1813) rigorous ‘Algebraic Anal-
ysis’ – even steps backwards in Cauchy’s book, particularly his
use of infinitesimals. . . ” ([43]; emphasis added).
(SS2) Siegmund-Schultze quotes Cauchy’s comments (in translation)
on rigor in geometry, and surmises that the framework for CdA
was Archimedean, similarly to Euclid’s geometry: “a non-Archi-
median interpretation of the continuum would clash with the
Euclidean theory, which was still the basis of Cauchy’s book. In-
deed, Cauchy writes in the ‘introduction’ to the Cours d’Analyse:
‘As for methods, I have sought to give them all the rigor that
one demands in geometry, . . . ’ ” (ibid.; emphasis added).
Siegmund-Schultze’s Zbl review goes on to continue the quotation from
Cauchy:
“. . . in such a way as never to revert to reasoning drawn
from the generality of algebra. Reasoning of this kind,
although commonly admitted, particularly in the pas-
sage from convergent to divergent series and from real
quantities to imaginary expressions, can, it seems to me,
only occasionally be considered as inductions suitable
for presenting the truth, since they accord so little with
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the precision so esteemed in the mathematical sciences.”
(Cauchy as quoted in [43]; emphasis added).
Cauchy’s objections here have to do with the cavalier use of diver-
gent series, based on a heuristic principle Cauchy called the gener-
ality of algebra, by his illustrious predecessors Euler and Lagrange,
rather than with the issue of using or not using infinitesimals, contrary
to Siegmund-Schultze’s claim. We will evaluate Siegmund-Schultze’s
claims further in Section 1.6.
1.6. Analysis of a review. The Zbl review quoted in Section 1.5
tends to confirm the diagnosis following Hacking. Namely, the com-
ment on infinitesimals quoted in (SS1) leading specifically backward
will surely be read by the Zbl audience as indicative of an assumption
of an organic (butterfly model) forward direction (culminating in the
great triumvirate).
Similarly, the comment quoted in (SS2) appears to take it for granted
that Euclid’s framework, being rigorous, was necessarily Archimedean.
Yet the facts are as follows:
(i) Books I through IV of The Elements are developed without the
Archimedean axiom;
(ii) developments around 1900 showed conclusively that the com-
pleteness property of R is irrelevant to the development of Eu-
clidean geometry, and in fact the latter can be developed in the
context of non-Archimedean fields.
Indeed, Hilbert proved that these parts of Euclidean geometry can be
developed in a non-Archimedean plane (modulo some specific assump-
tions such as circle–circle intersection and postulation of the congruence
theorems); see further in [5, Section 5].
While Euclid relied on the Archimedean axiom to develop his theory
of proportion, Hilbert obtained all the results of Euclidean geometry
including the theory of proportion and geometric similarity without
such a reliance; see Hartshorne ([31], 2000, Sections 12.3–12.5 and 20–
23) or Baldwin ([2], 2017).
Furthermore, starting with Descartes’ Geometry, mathematicians
implicitly relied on ordered field properties rather than the ancient
theory of proportion.
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Moreover, it is difficult to understand how Siegmund-Schutze would
reconcile his two claims. If Cauchy used Euclidean Archimedean math-
ematics exclusively, as implied by (SS2), then what exactly were the en-
tities that constituted a step backward, as claimed in (SS1)? Siegmund-
Schultze’s counterfactual claims are indicative of butterfly-model think-
ing as outlined in Section 1.4.
Like the Zbl review by Siegmund-Schultze, the Cauchy scholarship
of Gilain tends to be colored by teleological assumptions of the sort
detailed above, as we argue in Sections 2 and 3.
A number of historians and mathematicians have sought to chal-
lenge the received views on Cauchy’s infinitesimals, as we detail in
Sections 1.7 through 1.9.
1.7. Robinson on received views. Abraham Robinson noted that
the received view of the development of the calculus
[would] lead us to expect that, following the rejection of
Leibniz’ theory by Lagrange and D’Alembert, infinitely
small and infinitely large quantities would have no place
among the ideas of Cauchy, who is generally regarded
as the founder of the modern approach, or that they
might, at most, arise as figures of speech, as in ‘x tends
to infinity’. However, this expectation is mistaken. [40,
p. 269].
Robinson described Cauchy’s approach as follows:
Cauchy regarded his theory of infinitely small quanti-
ties as a satisfactory foundation for the theory of limits
and (d’Alembert’s suggestion notwithstanding) he did
not introduce the latter in order to replace the former.
His proof procedures thus involved both infinitely small
(and infinitely large) quantities and limits. [40, p. 271]
(emphasis added)
Note Robinson’s focus on Cauchy’s procedures (for a discussion of the
procedure/ontology dichotomy, see B laszczyk et al. [9]). After quoting
Cauchy’s definition of derivative, Robinson notes:
Later generations have overlooked the fact that in this
definition ∆x and ∆y were explicitly supposed to be in-
finitely small. Indeed according to our present standard
ideas, we take f ′(x) to be the limit [of] ∆y/∆x as ∆x
tends to zero, whenever that limit exists, without any
mention of infinitely small quantities. Thus, as soon
as we consider limits, the assumption that ∆x and ∆y
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are infinitesimal is completely redundant. It is therefore
the more interesting that the assumption is there, and,
indeed, appears again and again also in Cauchy’s later
expositions of the same topic (Cauchy [1829, 1844]). [40,
p. 274]
Robinson’s conclusion is as follows:
We are forced to conclude that Cauchy’s mental picture
of the situation was significantly different from the pic-
ture adopted today, in the Weierstrass tradition. (ibid.)
It is such received views in what Robinson refers to as the Weierstrass
tradition that we wish to reconsider here.
1.8. Grattan-Guinness on Cauchy’s infinitesimals. Robinson’s
1966 comments on the Weierstrassian tradition cited in Section 1.7
were echoed by historians Ivor Grattan-Guinness and Detlef Laugwitz.
Thus, fourteen years later, Grattan-Guinness wrote:
[Cauchy’s definition of infinitesimal] is in contrast to the
view adopted from the Weierstrassians onwards (and oc-
casionally earlier), where an infinitesimal is a variable
with limit zero. . . (Grattan-Guinness [27], 1980, p. 110;
emphasis added)
Concerning the term limit, it is necessary to disassociate the following
two issues:
(Ca1) the issue of whether or not limits were at the base of Cauchy’s
approach;
(Ca2) the issue of Cauchy’s systematic use of infinitesimals as numbers
in his textbooks and research articles.
1.9. Laugwitz on Cauchy’s infinitesimals. As far as item (Ca2)
is concerned, Laugwitz acknowledged that Cauchy started using in-
finitesimals systematically in the 1820s (whereas his attitude toward
them during the preceding decade was more ambiguous and limits may
have played a larger role):
. . . after 1820, Cauchy developed his analysis by utilizing
infinitesimals in a deliberate and consequent manner.
(Laugwitz [36], 1989, p. 196; emphasis in the original)
Laugwitz’ position is consistent with Gilain’s observation that infinites-
imals first appeared in Cauchy’s course summary during the academic
year 1820–1821:
Anne´e 1820–1821 . . . Notons aussi l’apparition, pour la
premie`re fois dans les Matie`res des lec¸ons, des notions
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de quantite´s infiniment petites et infiniment grandes
(lec¸on 3).2 (Gilain [23], §52, 1989)
In 1997, Laugwitz elaborated on the subject (of Cauchy’s endorsement
of infinitesimals circa 1820) in the following terms:
Cauchy avoided the use of the infinitely small. This pro-
voked growing criticism on the part of his colleagues,
including the physicist Petit, who emphasized the di-
dactical and practical advantages of the use of infin-
itely small magnitudes. In 1819 and in 1820, the Con-
seil d’Instruction at the Ecole exerted strong pressure
on Cauchy, but this alone would not have made this
rather stubborn man change his mind. Around 1820,
he must have realized that infinitesimal considerations
were a powerful research method at a time when he was
in a state of constant rivalry, especially with Poisson.
(Laugwitz [37], 1997, p. 657; emphasis added)
In the textbook Cours d’Analyse [15], limite is not the only central
foundational concept for Cauchy, as we argue in Section 2.
We challenge a common misconception according to which Cauchy
was forced to teach infinitesimals at the Ecole Polytechnique allegedly
against his will. We show that the debate there concerned mainly the
issue of rigor, a separate one from infinitesimals ; see Section 3.
2. Cauchy’s limite and infiniment petit
In this section we will analyze the meaning of Cauchy’s terms limite
and infiniment petit.
2.1. Differentials and infinitesimals. In his work, Cauchy care-
fully distinguishes between differentials ds, dt which to Cauchy are
noninfinitesimal variables, on the one hand, and infinitesimal incre-
ments ∆s,∆t, on the other:
. . . soit s une variable distincte de la variable primitive t.
En vertu des de´finitions adopte´es, le rapport entre les
diffe´rentielles ds, dt, sera la limite du rapport entre les
2Translation: “Year 1820–1821 . . . We also note the appearance, for the first time
in the Lesson summaries, of the notions of infinitely small and infinitely large
quantities (lesson 3).”
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accroissements infiniment petits ∆s,∆t.3 (Cauchy [17],
1844, p. 11; emphasis added)
Cauchy goes on to express such a relation by means of a formula in
terms of the infinitesimals ∆s and ∆t:
On aura donc
ds
dt
= lim.
∆s
∆t
(2.1)
(ibid., equation (1); the period after lim in “lim.” in the
original; equation number (2.1) added)
Cauchy’s procedure involving the passage from the ratio of infinitesi-
mals like ∆s
∆t
to the value of the derivative ds
dt
as in equation (2.1) has
a close parallel in Robinson’s infinitesimal analysis, where it is carried
out by the standard part function; see equations (4.1) and (4.2) in
Section 4.
Paraphrasing this definition in Archimedean terms would necessarily
involve elements that are not explicit in Cauchy’s definition. Thus
Cauchy’s “lim.” finds a closer proxy in the notion of standard part,
as in formula (4.3), than in any notion of limit in the context of an
Archimedean continuum; see also Bascelli et al. ([6], 2014).
2.2. Definite integrals and infinitesimals. Similar remarks apply
to Cauchy’s 1823 definition of the definite integral which exploits a
partition of the domain of integration into infinitesimal subintervals.
Here Cauchy writes: “D’apre`s ce qui a e´te´ dit dans la dernie`re lec¸on, si
l’on divise X−x0 en e´le´mens4 infiniment petits x1−x0, x2−x1 . . . X−
xn−1, la somme
(1) S = (x1 − x0)f(x0) + (x1 − x2)f(x1) + . . .+ (X − xn−1)f(xn−1)
convergera vers une limite repre´sente´e par l’inte´grale de´finie
(2)
∫ X
x0
f(x)dx.
Des principes sur lesquels nous avons fonde´ cette proposition il re´sulte,
etc.” (Cauchy [16], 1823, Lec¸on 22, p. 85; emphasis added).
Note that there is a misprint in Cauchy’s formula (1): the difference
(x1 − x2) should be (x2 − x1). In this passage, Cauchy refers to the
successive differences x1 − x0, x2 − x1, X − xn−1 as infinitely small
elements.
3Translation: “Let s be a variable different from the primitive variable t. By virtue
of the definitions given, the ratio of the differentials ds, dt will be the limit of the
ratio of the infinitely small increments ∆s,∆t.”
4We preserved the original spelling.
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Analogous partitions into infinitesimal subintervals are exploited in
Keisler’s textbook [34] (and throughout the literature on infinitesimal
analysis; see e.g., [24, p. 153]). Cauchy’s use of limite in the pas-
sage above is another instance of limit in the context of a Bernoullian
continuum, which parallels the use of the standard part function (see
Section 4) enabling the transition from a sum of type (1) above to the
definite integral (2), similar to the definition of the derivative analyzed
in Section 2.1.
2.3. Un infiniment petit in Cauchy. What is the precise meaning
of Cauchy’s infiniment petit (infinitely small)? All of Cauchy’s text-
books on analysis contain essentially the same definition up to slight
changes in word order:
Lorsque les valeurs nume´riques successives d’une meˆme
variable de´croissent inde´finiment, de manie`re a` s’abaisser
au-dessous de tout nombre donne´, cette variable devient
ce qu’on nomme un infiniment petit ou une quantite´ in-
finiment petite. Une variable de cette espe`ce a ze´ro pour
limite.5 [15, p. 4] (emphasis in the original)
An examination of the books [15], [16] reveals that Cauchy typically
did not define his infinitely small literally as a variable whose limit is
zero. Namely, he rarely wrote “an infinitely small is a variable, etc.”
but said, rather, that a variable becomes (devient) an infinitely small.
Thus, the passage cited above is the first definition of the infinitely
small in Cours d’Analyse. The next occurrence is on page 26 there,
again using devient, and emphasizing infiniment petite by means of ital-
ics. On page 27 Cauchy summarizes the definition as follows: “Soit α
une quantite´ infiniment petite, c’est-a`-dire, une variable dont la valeur
nume´rique de´croisse inde´finiment.” This is a summary of the definition
already given twice, the expression “infiniment petite” is not italicized,
and “is” is used in place of “becomes” as shorthand for the more de-
tailed and precise definitions appearing earlier in Cauchy’s textbook.
An identical definition with devient appears in his 1823 textbook [16,
p. 4].
5Translation: “When the successive numerical values of such a variable decrease
indefinitely, in such a way as to fall below any given number, this variable becomes
what we call infinitesimal, or an infinitely small quantity. A variable of this kind
has zero as its limit” [14, p. 7].
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Cauchy’s term becomes implies a change of nature or type.6 Namely,
a variable is not quite an infinitesimal yet, but only serves to generate
or represent one, as emphasized by Laugwitz:
Cauchy never says what his infinitesimals are; we are
told only how infinitesimals can be represented. (Laug-
witz [35], 1987, p. 271)
See also Sad et al. [41]. This indicates that Cauchy considered an
infinitesimal as a separate type of mathematical entity, distinct from
variable or sequence.
2.4. Variable quantities, infinitesimals, and limits. To comment
more fully on Cauchy’s passage cited in Section 2.3, note that there are
three players here:
(A) variable quantity;
(B) infinitesimal;
(C) limit zero.
We observe that the notion of variable quantity is the primitive notion
in terms of which both infinitesimals and limits are defined (see Sec-
tion 1.1 for Cauchy’s definition of limit in terms of variable quantity).
This order of priorities is confirmed by the title of Cauchy’s very first
lesson in his 1823 book:
1.re Lec¸on. Des variables, de leurs limites, et des quan-
tite´s infiniment petites [16, p. ix]
Thus, Cauchy is proposing a definition and an observation:
(Co1) a variable quantity that diminishes indefinitely becomes an in-
finitesimal; and
(Co2) such a variable quantity has zero as limit.
Here item (Co2) is merely a restatement of the property of diminishing
indefinitely in terms of the language of limits. As noted in Section 1,
Robinson pointed out that Cauchy assigned a central role to the notion
of a variable which tends to a limit. Cauchy’s notion of limit here is
close to the notion of limit of his predecessor Lacroix (see Section 3.9).
6To illustrate such a change in modern terms, note that in the context of the
traditional construction of the real numbers in terms of Cauchy sequences u =
(un) ∈ QN of rational numbers, one never says that a real number is a sequence, but
rather that a sequence represents or generates the real number, or to use Cauchy’s
terminology, becomes a real number. A related construction of hyperreal numbers
out of sequences of real numbers, where a sequence tending to zero generates an
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2.5. Assigning a sign to an infinitesimal. Cauchy often uses the
notation α for a generic infinitesimal, in both his 1821 and 1823 text-
books. In his 1823 textbook Cauchy assumes that α is either positive
or negative:
Cherchons maintenant la limite vers laquelle converge
l’expression (1 + α)
1
α , tandis que α s’approche inde´fini-
ment de ze´ro. Si l’on suppose d’abord la quantite´ α
positive et de la forme 1
m
, m de´signant un nombre entier
variable et susceptible d’un accroissement inde´fini, on
aura (1 + α)
1
α =
(
1 + 1
m
)m
. . . Supposons enfin que α
devienne une quantite´ ne´gative. Si l’on fait dans cette
hypothe`se 1 + α = 1
1+β
, β sera une quantite´ positive,
qui convergera elle-meˆme vers ze´ro, etc. [16, pp. 2–4]
It is well known that variable quantities or sequences that generate
Cauchyan infinitesimals are not necessarily monotone. Indeed, Cauchy
himself gives a non-monotone example at the beginning of CdA:
1
4
, 1
3
, 1
6
, 1
5
, 1
8
, 1
7
, &c. . . . [15, p. 27]
This poses a problem since it is not obvious how to assign a sign plus or
minus to an arbitrary null sequence (i.e., a sequence tending to zero).
When Cauchy actually uses infinitesimals in proofs and applications,
he assumes that they can be manipulated freely in arithmetic opera-
tions and other calculations. While formal order theory is a few decades
away and is not to be found as such in Cauchy, he does appear to as-
sume that a definite sign can be attached to an infinitesimal. Besides
assuming that they have a well-defined sign, Cauchy also routinely ap-
plies arithmetic operations to infinitesimals.
This creates a difficulty to those who consider that Cauchy merely
used the term “infinitely small” as shorthand for a sequence with
limit 0, since it is unclear how to assign a sign to an arbitrary null
sequence, whereas Cauchy does appear to assign a sign to his infinites-
imals.
Which process exactly did Cauchy envision when he spoke of a se-
quence becoming an infinitesimal? Cauchy does not explain. However,
Cauchy’s assumption that each infinitesimal has a sign suggests that a
sequence is not identical to the infinitesimal it generates.
Even monotone sequences are not closed under arithmetic opera-
tions. Namely, such operations necessarily lead to non-monotone ones,
including ones that change sign.
Cauchy routinely assumes in his work, particularly on integrals, that
one can freely add infinitesimals and obtain other infinitesimals, i.e.,
that the numbers involved are closed under arithmetic operations.
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Such an assumption is valid in modern theories of ordered fields
properly extending R, but if one is working with sequences, such an
assumption leads to a dilemma:
(1) either one only works with monotone ones, in which case one
gets into a problem of closedness under natural arithmetic op-
erations;
(2) or one works with arbitrary sequences, in which case the as-
sumption that a sequence can be declared to be either positive
or negative becomes problematic.
Cauchy was probably not aware of the difficulty that that one can’t
both assign a specific sign to α, and also have the freedom of applying
arithmetic operations to infinitesimals. The point however is that the
way he uses infinitesimals indicates that both conditions are assumed,
even though from the modern standpoint the justification provided
is insufficient. In other words, Cauchy’s procedures are those of an
infinitesimal-enriched framework, though the ontology of such a system
is not provided.
Cauchy most likely was not aware of the problem, for otherwise he
may have sought to address it in one way or another. He did have
some interest in asymptotic behavior of sequences. Thus, in some of
his texts from the late 1820s he tried to develop a theory of the order
of growth at infinity of functions. Such investigations were eventually
picked up by du Bois-Reymond, Borel, and Hardy; see Borovik–Katz
([11], 2012) for details.
2.6. Gilain on omnipresence of limits. Gilain refers to Cauchy’s
course in 1817 as a
cours tre`s important historiquement, ou` les bases de la
nouvelle analyse, notamment celle de l’Analyse alge´brique
de 1821, sont pose´es. . . [23, §30]
He goes on to note “l’omnipre´sence du concept de limite” (ibid.). How
are we to evaluate Gilain’s claim as to the “omnipresence” of the con-
cept of limit?
With regard to Cauchy’s pre-1820 courses such as the one in 1817
mentioned by Gilain, there appears to be a consensus among scholars
already noted in Section 1.8 concerning the absence of infinitesimals.
As far as Cauchy’s 1821 book is concerned, the presence (perhaps even
“omnipresence” as per Gilain) of limits in the definition of infinitesimals
goes hand-in-hand with the fact that Cauchy defined both limits and
infinitesimals in terms of the primitive notion of a variable quantity (see
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beginning of Section 1 as well as Section 2.4). It is therefore difficult
to agree with Gilain when he claims to know the following:
On sait que Cauchy de´finissait le concept d’infiniment
petit a` l’aide du concept de limite, qui avait le premier
roˆle (voir Analyse alge´brique, p. 19; . . . ) [23, note 67]
Here Gilain claims that it is the concept of limite that played a pri-
mary role in the definition of infinitesimal, with reference to page 19 in
the 1897 Ouevres Comple`tes edition of CdA [15]. The corresponding
page in the 1821 edition is page 4. We quoted Cauchy’s definition in
Section 2.3 and analyzed it in Section 2.4. An attentive analysis of the
definition indicates that it is more accurate to say that it is the concept
of variable quantity (rather than limite) that “avait le premier roˆle.”
Cauchy exploited the notion of limit in [15, Chapter 2, §3] in the
proofs of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. Theorem 1 compares the con-
vergence of the difference f(x + 1) − f(x) and that of the ratio f(x)
x
.
Theorem 2 compares the convergence of f(x+1)
f(x)
and [f(x)]
1
x . These
proofs can be viewed as prototypes of ǫ, δ arguments. On the other
hand, neither of the two proofs mentions infinitesimals. Therefore nei-
ther can support Gilain’s claim to the effect that Cauchy allegedly used
limits as a basis for defining infinitesimals. The proof of Theorem 1 is
analyzed in more detail in Section 3.8.
Cauchy’s procedures exploiting infinitesimals have stood the test of
time and proved their applicability in diverse areas of mathematics,
physics, and engineering.
Gilain and some other historians assume that the appropriate mod-
ern proxy for Cauchy’s limite necessarily operates in the context of
an Archimedean continuum (see Section 2.4). Yet the vitality and
robustness of Cauchy’s infinitesimal procedures is obvious given the
existence of proxies in modern theories of infinitesimals. What we ar-
gue is that modern infinitesimal proxies for Cauchy’s procedures are
more faithful to the original than Archimedean proxies that typically
involve anachronistic paraphrases of Cauchy’s briefer definitions and
arguments.
This article does not address the historical ontology of infinitesimals
(a subject that may require separate study) but rather the procedures of
infinitesimal calculus and analysis as found in Cauchy’s oeuvre (see [9]
for further details on the procedure/ontology dichotomy).
2.7. Limite and infinity. As we noted in Section 1.3, the use of
the term limite by Cauchy could be misleading to a modern reader.
Consider for example its use in the passage cited in Section 2.3. The
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fact that Cauchy is not referring here to a modern notion of limit is
evident from his very next sentence:
Lorsque les valeurs nume´riques successives d’une meˆme
variable croissent de plus en plus, de manie`re a` s’e´lever
au-dessus de tout nombre donne´, on dit que cette vari-
able a pour limite l’infini positif indique´ par le signe ∞
s’il s’agit d’une variable positive. . . 7 [16, p. 4]
In today’s calculus courses, it is customary to give an (ǫ, δ) or (ǫ, N)
definition of limit of, say, a sequence, and then introduce infinite ‘limits’
in a broader sense when the sequence diverges to infinity. But Cauchy
does not make a distinction between convergent limits and divergent
infinite limits.
Scholars ranging from Sinaceur ([44], 1973) to Nakane ([39], 2014)
have pointed out that Cauchy’s notion of limit is distinct from the
Weierstrassian Epsilontik one (this is particularly clear from Cauchy’s
definition of the derivative analyzed in Section 2.1); nor did Cauchy
ever give an ǫ, δ definition of limit, though prototypes of ǫ, δ arguments
do occasionally appear in Cauchy; see Section 1.2.
3. Minutes of meetings, Poisson, and de Prony
Here we develop an analysis of the third of the misconceptions diag-
nozed in Borovik–Katz ([11], 2012, Section 2.5), namely the idea that
Cauchy was forced to teach infinitesimals at the Ecole Polytechnique
allegedly against his will. We show that the debate there concerned
mainly the issue of rigor, a separate one from infinitesimals.
Minutes of meetings at the Ecole are a valuable source of informa-
tion concerning the scientific and pedagogical interactions there in the
1820s.
3.1. Cauchy pressured by Poisson and de Prony. Gilain provides
detailed evidence of the pressure exerted by Sime´on Denis Poisson,
Gaspard de Prony, and others on Cauchy to simplify his analysis course.
Thus, in 1822
Poisson et de Prony. . . insistent [sur la] ne´cessite´. . . de
simplifier l’enseignement de l’analyse, en multipliant les
exemples nume´riques et en re´duisant beaucoup la partie
analyse alge´brique place´e au de´but du cours. [23, §61]
7Translation: “When the successive numerical values [i.e., absolute values] of the
same variable grow larger and larger so as to rise above each given number, one
says that this variable has limit positive infinity denoted by the symbol ∞ when
the variable is positive.”
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Similarly, in 1823, Cauchy’s course was criticized for being too compli-
cated:
des voix se sont e´leve´es pour trouver trop complique´es
les feuilles de cours en question et il e´tait de´cide´ de
proposer au Ministre la nomination d’une commission
qui serait charge´e chaque anne´e de l’examen des feuilles
d’analyse et des modifications e´ventuelles a` y apporter.
[23, §72]
The critics naturally include Poisson and de Prony:
Cette commission, effectivement mise en place, com-
prendra, outre Laplace, pre´sident, les examinateurs de
mathe´matiques (Poisson et de Prony),. . . (ibid.)
The complaints continue in 1825 as Franc¸ois Arago declares that
ce qu’il y a de plus utile a` faire pour le cours d’analyse,
c’est de le simplifier. [23, §84]
At this stage Cauchy finally caves in and declares (in third person):
il ne s’attachera plus a` donner, comme il a fait jusqu’a`
pre´sent, des de´monstrations parfaitement rigoureuses.
[23, §86] (emphasis added)
Note however that in these discussions, the issue is mainly that of rigor
(i.e., too many proofs) rather than choice of a particular approach to
the foundations of analysis. While Cauchy’s commitment to simplify
the course may have entailed skipping the proofs in the style of the
Epsilontik of Theorems 1 and 2 in [15, Chapter 2, §3] (see end of
Section 2.4), it may have also entailed skipping the proofs of as many
as eight theorems concerning the properties of infinitesimals of various
orders in [15, Chapter 2, §1], analyzed in [11, Section 2.3].
3.2. Reports by de Prony. Gilain notes that starting in 1826, there
is a new source of information concerning Cauchy’s course, namely the
reports by de Prony:
de Prony reproche de fac¸on ge´ne´rale a` Cauchy de ne pas
utiliser suffisamment les conside´rations ge´ome´triques et
les infiniment petits, tant en analyse qu’en me´canique.
[23, §101] (emphasis added)
Thus with regard to the post-1820 period, only starting in 1826 do we
have solid evidence that not merely excessive rigor but also insufficient
use of infinitesimals was being contested. Even here, the complaint
is not an alleged absence of infinitesimals, but merely insufficient use
thereof. We will examine de Prony’s views in Section 3.5.
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3.3. Course summaries. According to course summaries reproduced
in [23], Cauchy taught both continuous functions and infinitesimals
(and presumably the definition of continuity in terms of infinitesimals
after 1820) in the premie`re anne´e during the academic years 1825–1826,
1826–1827, 1827–1828, and 1828–1829 (the summaries for the premie`re
anne´e during the 1829–1830 academic year, Cauchy’s last at the Ecole
Polytechnique, are not provided). All these summaries contain identical
comments on continuity and infinitesimals for those years:
Des fonctions en ge´ne´ral, et des fonctions continues en
particulier. – Repre´sentation ge´ome´trique des fonctions
continues d’une seule variable. – Du rapport entre l’accroisse-
ment d’une fonction et l’accroissement de la variable. –
Valeur que prend ce rapport quand les accroissemens de-
viennent infiniment petits. (Cauchy as quoted by Gilain;
emphasis added)
In 1827 for the first time we find a claim of an actual absence of in-
finitesimals from Cauchy’s teaching. Thus, on 12 january 1827,
le cours de Cauchy a de nouveau e´te´ mis en cause pour sa
difficulte´, (le gouverneur affirmant que des e´le`ves avaient
de´clare´ qu’ils ne le comprenaient pas), et son non-usage
de la me´thode des infiniment petits (voir document C12).8
[23, §103] (emphasis added)
Tellingly, this comment by Gilain is accompanied by a footnote 111
where Gilain acknowledges that in the end Cauchy did use infinitesi-
mals that year in his treatment of the theory of contact of curves; see
Section 3.4 for details.
3.4. Cauchy taken to task. Gilain writes that during the 1826–1827
academic year, Cauchy was taken to task in the Conseil de Perfection-
nement of the E´cole Polytechnique for allegedly not teaching infinites-
imals (see [23, §103]). Gilain goes on to point out in his footnote 111
8To comment on Gilain’s “document C12” (denoted C12 in [23]), it is necessary to
reproduce what the document actually says: “Un membre demande si le professeur
expose la me´thode des infiniment petits, ainsi que le voeu en a e´te´ exprime´.” What
was apparently Cauchy’s response to this query is reproduced in the next paragraph
of document C12: “On re´pond que le commencement du cours ne pourra eˆtre fonde´
sur les notions infinite´simales que l’anne´e prochaine, parce que le cours de cette
anne´e e´tait commence´ a` l’e´poque ou` cette disposition a e´te´ arreˆte´e; que M. Cauchy
s’occupe de la re´daction de ses feuilles, en conse´quence, et qu’il a promis de les
communiquer bientoˆt a` la commission de l’enseignement mathe´matique.”
Thus, the actual contents of document C12 indicate that Gilain’s claim of “non-
usage” is merely an extrapolation.
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that Cauchy exploited infinitesimals anyway that year, in developing
the theory of contact of curves:
S’il ne fonde pas le calcul diffe´rentiel et inte´gral sur la
‘me´thode’ des infiniment petits, Cauchy n’en utilise pas
moins de fac¸on importante ces objets (conside´re´s comme
des variables dont la limite est ze´ro),9 en liaison no-
tamment avec l’exposition de la the´orie du contact des
courbes. [23, note 111]
It emerges that Cauchy did use infinitesimals that year in his treatment
of a more advanced topic (theory of contact). Thus Cauchy’s actual
scientific practice was not necessarily dependent on his preliminary
definitions. There is conflicting evidence as to whether Cauchy used
infinitesimals (as developed in [15] and [16]) in the introductory part
of his course that year. As we mentioned in Section 3.2, the course
summary for 1826–1827 does include both continuity and infinitesimals.
3.5. Critique by de Prony. Gilain describes de Prony’s criticism of
Cauchy as follows:
[De Prony] critique notamment l’emploi de la me´thode
des limites par Cauchy au lieu de celle des infiniment
petits, faisant appel ici a` l’autorite´ posthume de Laplace,
de´ce´de´ depuis le 5 mars 1827 (voir document C14).
[23, §105]
Here Gilain is referring to the following comments by de Prony:
Les de´monstrations des formules generales10 du mouve-
ment varie´ se sont encor trouve´es mele´es de considera-
tions relatives aux limites ; . . . (de Prony as quoted in
Grattan-Guinness [28], 1990, p. 1339; emphasis in the
original)
Having specified the target of his criticism, namely Cauchy’s concept
of limite, de Prony continues:
. . . il me semble qu’en employant, immediatement et ex-
clusivement, la methode des infiniment petits, on abrege
et on simplifie les raisonnements sans nuire a` la clarte´;
9Gilain’s parenthetical remark here is an editorial comment for which he provides
no evidence. The remark reveals more about Gilain’s own default expectations (see
Section 1) than about Cauchy’s actual foundational stance.
10The spelling as found in (Gilain [23, Document C14]) is ge´ne´rales (i.e., the modern
French spelling). Gilain similarly replaced encor by encore, mele´es by meˆle´es,
immediatement by imme´diatement, methode by me´thode, abrege by abre`ge, and
collegue by colle`gue.
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rappellons nous combien cette methode e´tait recommande´e
par l’illustre collegue [Laplace] que la mort nous a en-
leve´. (ibid.)
What is precisely the nature of de Prony’s criticism of Cauchy’s ap-
proach to analysis? Does his criticism focus on excessive rigor, or on
infinitesimals, as Gilain claims? The answer depends crucially on un-
derstanding de Prony’s own approach, explored in Section 3.6.
3.6. De Prony on small oscillations. In his work Me´canique philo-
sophique, de Prony considers infinitesimal oscillations of the pendulum
(de Prony [19], 1799, p. 86, §125). He gives the familiar formula for the
period or more precisely halfperiod, namely
π
√
a
g
where a is the length of the cord, and g is acceleration under gravity.
Limits are not mentioned. In the table on the following page 87, he
states the property of isochronism, meaning that the halfperiod π
√
a
g
is independent of the size of the infinitesimal amplitude. This however
is not true literally but only up to a passage to limits, or taking the
standard part;11 see Section 4. Thus de Prony’s own solution to the
conceptual difficulties involving limits/standard parts in this case is
merely to ignore the difficulties and suppress the limits.
In his article “Suite des lec¸ons d’analyse,” de Prony lets n = Az
([18], 1796, p. 237). He goes on to write down the formula
cos z =
[
cos z
n
+ sin z
n
√−1 ]n + [cos z
n
− sin z
n
√−1 ]n
2
as well as a similar formula for the sine function. Next, de Prony makes
the following remark:
Je remarque maintenant qu’a` mesure que A diminue et n
augmente, ces e´quations s’approchent de devenir
cos z =
[
1 + z
√
−1
n
]n
+
[
1− z
√
−1
n
]n
2
(3.1)
(ibid.; labeling (3.1) added)
11Even if literally infinitesimal amplitudes are admitted, there is still a discrepancy
disallowing one to claim that the halfperiod is literally π
√
a
g
. This difficulty can be
overcome in the context of modern infinitesimal analysis; see Kanovei et al. ([32],
2016).
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De Prony’s formula (3.1) is correct only up to taking the standard part
of the right-hand side (for infinite n). Again de Prony handles the
conceptual difficulty of dealing with infinite and infinitesimal numbers
by suppressing limits or standard parts. Note that both of de Prony’s
formulas are taken verbatim from (Euler [21], 1748, §133 – §138).12
It is reasonable to assume that de Prony’s criticism of Cauchy’s
teaching of prospective engineers had to do with what Prony saw as
excessive fussiness in dealing with what came to be viewed later as
conceptual difficulties of passing to the limit, i.e., taking the standard
part. Note that in the comment by de Prony cited at the beginning of
this section, he does not criticize Cauchy for not using infinitesimals,
but merely for excessive emphasis on technical detail involving limites.
Therefore Gilain’s claim to the contrary cited at the beginning of Sec-
tion 3.5 amounts to massaging the evidence by putting a tendentious
spin on de Prony’s criticism.
3.7. Foundations, limits, and infinitesimals. Can one claim that
Cauchy established the foundations of analysis on the concept of infin-
itesimal?
The notions of infinitesimal, limit, and variable quantity are all fun-
damental for Cauchy. One understands them only by the definition
which explains how they interact. If Cauchy established such foun-
dations it was on the concept of a variable quantity, as analyzed in
Section 2.4.
Can one claim that Cauchy conferred upon limite a central role in
the architecture of analysis? The answer is affirmative if one takes
note of the frequency of the occurrence of the term in Cauchy’s oeuvre;
similarly, Cauchy conferred upon infinitesimals a central role in the
said architecture.
A more relevant issue, however, is the precise meaning of the term
limite as used by Cauchy. As we saw in Section 2.1 he used it in the
differential calculus in a sense closer to the standard part function than
to any limit concept in the context of an Archimedean continuum; and
as we saw in Section 2.2, he used it in the integral calculus in a sense
closer to the standard part than any Archimedean counterpart.
12Schubring lodges the following claim concerning de Prony: “The break with pre-
vious tradition, which was probably the most visible to his contemporaries, was the
exclusion and rejection of infiniment petits by the analytic method. In de Prony the
infiniment petits were excluded from the foundational concepts of his teaching by
simply not being mentioned; only in a heading did they appear in a quotation, as
‘so-called analysis of the infinitely small quantities’” (Schubring [42], 2005, p. 289).
Schubring’s assessment of de Prony’s attitude toward infinitesimals seems about as
apt as his assessment of Cauchy’s; see (B laszczyk et al. [10], 2017).
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Did Cauchy ever seek a justification of infinitesimals in terms of lim-
its? Hardly so, since he expressed both concepts in terms of a primitive
notion of variable quantity. In applications of analysis, Cauchy makes
no effort to justify infinitesimals in terms of limits.
3.8. Cauchy’s A-track arguments. Let us examine in more detail
the issue of ǫ, δ arguments in Cauchy, as found in [15, Section 2.3,
Theorem 1] (already mentioned in Section 2.6). Cauchy seeks to show
that if the difference f(x+1)−f(x) converges towards a certain limit k,
for increasing values of x, then the ratio f(x)
x
converges at the same time
towards the same limit; see [14, p. 35].
Cauchy chooses ǫ > 0, and notes that we can give the number h a
value large enough so that, when x is equal to or greater than h, the
difference f(x+1)− f(x) is always contained between k− ǫ and k + ǫ.
Cauchy then arrives at the formula
f(h+ n)− f(h)
n
= k + α,
where α is a quantity contained between the limits −ǫ and +ǫ, and
eventually obtains that the ratio f(x)
x
has for its limit a quantity con-
tained between k − ǫ and k + ǫ.
This is a fine sample of a prototype of an ǫ, δ proof in Cauchy. How-
ever, as pointed out by Sinkevich, Cauchy’s proofs are all missing the
tell-tale sign of a modern proof in the tradition of the Weierstrassian
Epsilontik, namely exhibiting an explicit functional dependence of δ (or
in this case h) on ǫ (Sinkevich [45], 2016).
One of the first occurrences of a modern definition of continuity in
the style of the Epsilontik can be found in Schwarz’s summaries of 1861
lectures by Weierstrass; see (Dugac [20], 1973, p. 64), (Yushkevich [47],
1986, pp. 74–75). This definition is a verbal form of a definition fea-
turing a correct quantifier order (involving alternations of quantifiers).
The salient point here is that this sample of Cauchy’s work has no
bearing on Cauchy’s infinitesimals. Nor does it imply that infinitesi-
mals are merely variables tending to zero, since the term infinitely small
does not occur in this proof at all. Nor does Cauchy’s argument show
that he thought of limits in anything resembling post-Weierstrassian
terms since his recurring definition of limit routinely falls back on the
primitive notion of a variable quantity, rather than on any form of an
alternating quantifier string, whether verbal or not.
3.9. Lacroix, Laplace, and Poisson. The Bradley–Sandifer edition
quotes a revealing comment of Cauchy’s on the importance of infinites-
imals. The comment is found in Cauchy’s introduction:
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In speaking of the continuity of functions, I could not
dispense with a treatment of the principal properties
of infinitely small quantities, properties which serve as
the foundation of the infinitesimal calculus. (Cauchy as
translated in [14, p. 1])
Bradley and Sandifer then go on to note: “It is interesting that Cauchy
does not also mention limits here” (ibid., note 6; emphasis added).
The circumstances of the publication of the 1821 Cours d’Analyse
indicate that attaching fundamental importance to infinitesimals rather
than limits (noted by Bradley and Sandifer) was Cauchy’s personal
choice, rather than being dictated by the constraints of his teaching at
the E´cole Polytechnique. Indeed, unlike Cauchy’s later textbooks, his
1821 book was not commissioned by the E´cole but was rather written
upon the personal request of Laplace and Poisson, as acknowledged in
(Gilain [23], 1989, note 139).
Sinaceur points out that Cauchy’s definition of limit resembles, not
that of Weierstrass, but rather that of Lacroix13 dating from 1810
(see [44, p. 108–109]).14 This is acknowledged in (Grabiner [25], 1981,
p. 80).
Cauchy’s kinematic notion of limit was expressed, like his notion of
infinitesimal α, in terms of a primitive notion of variable quantity (see
Section 2.4). Thus, Cauchy’s comment that when a variable becomes
an infinitesimal α, the limit of such a variable is zero, can be interpreted
in two ways. It can be interpreted in the context of an Archimedean
continuum. Alternatively, it could be interpreted as the statement that
the assignable part of α is zero, in the context of a Bernoullian (i.e.,
infinitesimal-enriched) continuum, or in modern terminology, that the
standard part of α is zero; see Section 4.
13As a student at the Polytechnique, Cauchy attended Lacroix’s course in analysis
in 1805; see (Belhoste [8], 1991, p. 10, 243).
14Sinaceur explicitly denies Cauchy the honor of having published the first arith-
metic definition of limits, by writing: “Or, 1) l’e´psilonisation n’est pas l’œuvre de
Cauchy, mais celle de Weierstrass ; . . . on ne peut dire qu’il en donne une de´finition
purement arithme´tique ou purement analytique. Sa de´finition . . . n’enveloppe pas
moins d’intuition ge´ome´trique que celle contenue dans le Traite´ de Lacroix. . . ”
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4. Modern infinitesimals in relation to Cauchy’s
procedures
While set-theoretic justifications for either A-track or B-track mod-
ern framework are obviously not to be found in Cauchy, Cauchy’s proce-
dures exploiting infinitesimals find closer proxies in Robinson’s frame-
work for analysis with infinitesimals than in a Weierstrassian frame-
work. In this section we outline a set-theoretic construction of a hy-
perreal extension R →֒ ∗R, and point out specific similarities between
procedures using the hyperreals, on the one hand, with Cauchy’s pro-
cedures, on the other.
Let RN denote the ring of sequences of real numbers, with arithmetic
operations defined termwise. Then we have ∗R = RN/MAX where
MAX is the maximal ideal consisting of all “negligible” sequences (un).
Here a sequence is negligible if it vanishes for a set of indices of full
measure ξ, namely, ξ
({n ∈ N : un = 0}) = 1. Here ξ : P(N) → {0, 1}
is a finitely additive probability measure taking the value 1 on cofinite
sets, where P(N) is the set of subsets of N. The subset Fξ ⊆ P(N)
consisting of sets of full measure ξ is called a nonprincipal ultrafilter.
These originate with (Tarski [46], 1930). The set-theoretic presentation
of a Bernoullian continuum (see Section 1.2) outlined here was therefore
not available prior to that date.
The field R is embedded in ∗R by means of constant sequences. The
subring hR ⊆ ∗R consisting of the finite elements of ∗R admits a map st
to R, known as standard part
st : hR→ R, (4.1)
which rounds off each finite hyperreal number to its nearest real number
(the existence of such a map st is the content of the standard part
principle). This enables one, for instance, to define the derivative of
s = f(t) as
f ′(t) =
ds
dt
= st
(
∆s
∆t
)
(4.2)
(here ∆s 6= 0 is infinitesimal) which parallels Cauchy’s definition of
derivative (see equation (2.1) in Section 2.1) more closely than any
Epsilontik definition. Limit is similarly defined in terms of st, e.g., by
setting
lim
t→0
f(t) = st(f(ǫ)) (4.3)
where ǫ is a nonzero infinitesimal, in analogy with Cauchy’s limit as
analyzed in Section 1.3. For additional details on Robinson’s framework
see e.g., [22].
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5. Conclusion
The oft-repeated claim (as documented e.g., in [3]; [7]) that “Cauchy’s
infinitesimal is a variable with limit 0” (see Gilain’s comment cited in
Section 3.4) is a reductionist view of Cauchy’s foundational stance, at
odds with much compelling evidence in Cauchy’s writings, as we argued
in Sections 2 and 3.
Gilain, Siegmund-Schultze, and some other historians tend to adopt
a butterfly model for the development of analysis, to seek proxies for
Cauchy’s procedures in a default modern Archimedean framework, and
to view his infinitesimal techniques as an evolutionary dead-end in
the history of analysis. Such an attitude was criticized by Grattan-
Guinness, as discussed in Section 1. The fact is that, while Cauchy
did use an occasional epsilon in an Archimedean sense, his techniques
relying on infinitesimals find better proxies in a modern framework
exploiting a Bernoullian continuum.
Robinson first proposed an interpretation of Cauchy’s procedures in
the framework of a modern theory of infinitesimals in [40] (see Sec-
tion 1.7). A set-theoretic foundation for infinitesimals could not have
been provided by Cauchy for obvious reasons, but Cauchy’s procedures
find closer proxies in modern infinitesimal frameworks than in modern
Archimedean ones.
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